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Introduction 
Studies on the cotton industry proliferate. Remarkably, the cotton industry 
has figured in recent debates over the amplitude and significance of the Brit-
ish Industrial Revolution, the loss of British competitive advantage, and the 
wealth and the poverty of nations in the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries. As research moves forward, it seems obvious that the comparative 
history of the European cotton industry in the period before the "cotton 
famine" has been grossly neglected. There have been several splendid books 
and articles on some national cases but the comparative perspective has 
barely been touched. In particular, to date no study has systematically ana-
lyzed the cotton textile industry in the Mediterranean basin during the early 
industrialization period. This chapter fIlls that gap by adopting a compara-
tive perspective. More specifically, this chapter concentrates its energies on 
providing a careful analysis of the technological choices of four cotton indus-
tries: the two largest producers in the Mediterranean basin and the two largest 
producers in the world, from 1830 to 1860. 
Before the arrival of the "cotton famine" in the 1860s, the most important 
settlements of the modern cotton industry in the Mediterranean basin were 
in Catalonia (Spain) and in the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia.! Simulta-
neously, the world leadership in cotton textiles was in the hands of 
Lancashire (Britain), while New England (United States) occupied the 
second position. In these regions, the cotton industry represented the first 
large-scale application of modern technology and the factory system. How-
ever, these four cotton industries differed strongly. In the beginning, the new 
cotton mills followed the British model but within a few years each country 
had developed its own practices and adapted the British technology to its 
own needs. Therefore, it seems that there is a strong case for placing primary 
stress on the cotton industry as the first example of how technological choice 
is influenced by local conditions. 
Few economic historians believed in the absolute tyranny of fixed factor 
proportions and fixed attribute bundles; that is, in the argument that the 
choice of technology is technologically determined. Hence, the majority 
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recognized that there existed a fairly wide range of alternative technology 
choices. However, economic historians vary in the reasons they stress. For 
Habakkuk (1962) the choice of different technologies reflects differences in 
factor endowments. In particular, he argued that land abundance and 
labour scarcity in the United States led to high relative wages and the substi-
tution of capital for labour. Instead, for North (1981) institutions had crucial 
importance for technological change since their historical development will 
decide the outcome of any economic activity in a community. Institutions 
should be seen in terms of cultural norms, written rules and unwritten codes 
of conduct that provide the framework within which economic agents func-
tion. Finally, David (1985) posits more emphasis on the path-dependence of 
technological choices. Divergence on technological choices has occurred, in 
this view, but not simply because of differences in factor endowments or insti-
tutions. Rather, the argument is that successive developments depend on 
prior events. Consequently, it seems that by focusing explicitly on technolog-
ical choice, one can open the door to a deeper understanding of how prior 
history, institutions and factor prices could affect technological innovation 
and long-run growth. 
The recent literature on the history of the cotton industry contains three 
broad perspectives as well. One maintains the unimportance of alternative 
technological choices in the cotton industry. In particular, Clark (1987) 
diminished the importance of alternative technology, thereby asserting that 
countries with different factor prices showed no evidence of any difference 
in cotton-spinning techniques at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
According to his view, the effort of workers was the major determinant of the 
performance of cotton industries. A second view stresses that patterns of 
adoption of technology are basically consistent with a rational response to 
prevailing factor costs. For Von Tunzelmann (1978) the technological 
choices of British, Belgian, and American manufacturers were constrained 
in the first place by the price they had to pay for energy. For example, he 
pointed out that in the United States the abundance of (cheap) water power 
was the incentive offered to develop a new, more power-intensive technology 
(the ring throstle). For Saxonhouse and Wright (1984), the choice of tech-
nology was driven by geographical factors and the capacity to innovate. In 
particular, they argued that the diffusion of ring-spinning was constrained by 
the availability of high -quality cotton and subsequently by ingenuity in devis-
ing alternatives like cotton-mixing. Instead, Harley (1992) considered 
implicitly a larger set of factors in his comparison between the British and 
American cotton industries in the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, he 
included the relative prices of raw cotton, energy, skills and labour as deter-
minants of the technology. A third interpretation posits a more fundamental 
role in institutional factors. Lazonick (1990) claimed the importance of 
entrepreneurial failures for the choice of technology. In particular, he cen-
sured the British entrepreneurs for their alleged failure to choose the cor-
rect techniques in spinning and weaving during the late nineteenth and 
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early twentieth centuries. According to his arguments, the fundamental 
error was retaining the British industry'S horizontal specialization into spin-
ning and weaving factories. Similarly, Fisher emphasized the reluctance of 
Swiss textile entrepreneurs to adopt the new spinning machinery. He argued 
that these entrepreneurs were more risk avoiders than profit maximizers 
(Fisher 1991: 151). Finally, for Otsuka et al. (1988) differential technological 
performance between the Japanese and Indian cotton industries emanated 
from differences in market structure and government intervention. They 
pointed out that in Japan the relative absence of market-intervention poli-
cies helped to both ensure an efficient choice ofimported technology and to 
have it adapted in appropriate directions. 
While I recognize the importance of institutional and cultural differentials 
across countries, my basic premise is that labour-force skills and factor 
endowments are of crucial significance to the choice of technology in cotton 
textiles. In the period before the "cotton famine", alternative technological 
choices were relatively important. However, these technology alternatives 
cannot be interpreted without consideration of the heterogeneity of cotton 
cloth. In other words, the production of different kinds of cotton cloth 
employed a particular amount of physical and human capital, labour, energy 
and raw cotton. Moreover, some types of machinery were more adept than 
others in the production of some kinds of cotton goods. For instance, the 
throstle employed more energy and less skilled labour, and was better at spin-
ning coarse yarn than the mule. In consequence, one can argue that the 
choice of product and machinery was intimately connected with the avail-
ability of skilled labour and relative factor prices in this early period of the 
factory-based cotton industry. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, 
the main characteristics (size, quality-mix and export performance) of these 
four cotton industries are discussed. The third section provides an analysis of 
technological developments in cotton textiles during the period. The fourth 
section discusses the process of diffusion of the cotton-textile technology in 
Lancashire, New England, Catalonia and Piedmont. This is followed by a sec-
tion which develops a framework for understanding how technological 
choices and quality-mix were interrelated and how quality choices were 
decided by factor endowments, especially workforce skills. The last section 
concludes and summarizes. 
Main characteristics: size, quality-mix and export 
performance 
For the sake of comparison, it is useful to know how large the cotton indus-
tries of Catalonia, New England, Britain and Piedmont were. To answer this 
question, I rely on the amount of cloth produced more than on the number 
of spindles or raw-cotton import figures. The number of spindles is not a 
good indicator of the size of the cotton industry because the productivity of 
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Table 6.1 Production of cotton cloth: Catalonia, New England, Britain and Piedmont, 
1830-1860 (in thousands of m', average per year) 
Catalonia New England Britain Piedmont 
1830-40 21291 229440 680614 9690 
1840-50 51430 414972 1 140804 17701 
1850-60 109132 612815 1852892 34165 
1830-60 60500 420345 1 233 122 20519 
Notes and Sources: 
Numbers subject to rounding errors. 
New England's data is drawn from Davis and Stettler (1966: Table 4, 221). 
The procedure to compute the Catalan and British figures was the following. First, according 
Huberman's (1996) method, a disaggregated yarn output series was constructed for Catalonia 
and Britain. Then, under the assumption that yarn exports and yarn inventories had the same 
distribution as yarn production, I derived the amount of yarn consumed in the weaving industry 
where the figures on British yarn exports are drawn from Ellison (1968: Table 2). That is, total 
yarn production minus exports of yarn, inventories, and wastage (5 per cent) during weaving. 
To arrive at output in m', I multiply the weight of the cloth consumed by a fixed coefficient. The 
coefficients are different for each quality also different for Catalonia and Britain. The Catalan 
coefficients are derived from Comisi6n Especial Arancelaria (1867) and the British coefficients 
from the figures on cotton fabrics from The Economist (1845). Then I sum across qualities to 
compute total estimates. 
Piedmont's figures on raw cotton imports were drawn from Quazza (1961: 221). After deleting 
re-exports with coefficients furnished by Castronovo (1965: 282-283), these figures have been 
transformed into raw cotton consumption. Then, with quality figures of Table 6.3 and Catalan 
weights, I convert raw cotton consumption into m' of cotton. 
spindles varies strongly with yarn quality (count). Similarly, the level of raw-
cotton consumption does not furnish information on the real amount of 
production since, for example, wastage and the weight of the product vary 
according to yarn quality.2 For the reasons above, my choice was to compare 
cloth produced in square metres (m2). Table 6.1 shows the results. 
This table immediately reveals that the British cotton industry was gigantic 
when compared with its rivals. In particular, on average, it was about three 
times as large as the second-largest cotton industry, New England. Moreover, 
in comparison with Britain or New England, both the Catalan and the 
Piedmont cotton industries were minuscule. Thus, by the 1850s, the British 
cotton industry was about seventeen times the size of the Catalan cotton 
industry and about fifty-four times the size of the Piedmont cotton industry. 
Finally, it should be noted that the cotton industry of New England did not 
progress in the same way as the cotton industry in Great Britain, Catalonia 
and Piedmont. 
A common characteristic of these four regions was that they contained 
most of the cotton industry of their respective countries. By 1861, Catalonia 
produced about 75 per cent of Spanish cotton textiles.s However, some years 
earlier these indices of concentration were even higher when Catalonia 
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Table 6.2 Quality distribution of cloth production: Catalonia, Lombardy, New Eng-
land and Britain, 1830-1860 (in average per cent per year) 
Catalonia <20 20-40 40-60 60-80 
1830--40 68.37 3l.44 0.10 0.09 
1840-50 25.94 71.89 l.83 0.35 
1850-60 18.06 76.43 4.04 1.47 
1830-60 25.93 70.31 2.77 0.99 
Lombardy <20 20-40 40-60 60-80 
1856 66.73 33.00 0.26 O.ot 
New England <16 >18 
1830-40 75.99 24.01 
1840-50 73.44 26.56 
1850-60 76.12 23.88 
1830-60 75.27 24.73 
Britain <20 20-40 40-60 60-80 >80 
1830-40 17.12 45.24 24.16 8.03 5.44 
1840-50 14.82 48.66 27.87 4.44 4.21 
1850-60 8.10 48.79 34.29 4.60 4.22 
1830-60 1l.76 48.12 30.55 5.17 4.40 
Notes and Sources: 
Numbers subject to rounding errors. 
Spanish figures corresponded to Spanish counts and British, Lombardy's and New England's to 
English counts. Therefore, since the Spanish counts were slightly finer than the corresponding 
English counts, Spanish figures understated the quality of the Spanish production. When it has 
been possible, figures are computed as arithmetic averages to avoid cyclical variation in quality 
due to changes in the prices of raw cotton and short-term market adjustments. 
New England data are drawn from Davis and Stettler (1966: Table A.2). Note that the New 
England figures are based on a sample of firms but in the entire population. 
Lombardy'S data are drawn from Zanelli (1967: Table 42). 
For sources of the Catalan and British data see the previous Table 6.1. 
enjoyed a de facto monopoly of the factory-based cotton industry in Spain. 
Thus, in the 1850s, new factory-based cotton industries emerged in the Prov-
ince of Malaga (Andalusia) and the Basque country (NadalI974: 218-25). 
Due to the political fragmentation and the presence ofimportant trade bar-
riers, the Italian cotton industry was less concentrated than the Spanish. By 
the 1850s, Piedmont produced about 43 per cent ofItalian cotton cloth but 
gradually lost its share of Italian production with the emergence of the 
cotton industry in other regions (Castronovo 1965: 284). Thus, other impor-
tant settlements of cotton mills in Italy were in Lombardy, Liguria, Cam-
pania, Veneto and Tuscany (A'Hearn 1998: 736ft). In 1850, New England 
produced about 67 per cent of US cotton textiles (DeBow 1970: Table 
CXCVI, 180). It should be noted, however, that since the 1820s the develop-
ment of the cotton industry in the southern and the mid-Atlantic regions 
had reduced New England's share in the US figures (Harley 1992). In 1856, 
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about 68 per cent of British employment in cotton mills was in Lancashire. 
By sharp contrast with the other three regions, from 1822 to 1856, 
Lancashire increased its share in national output. 4 
It should be emphasized that the disparities in the quality of cloth among 
these countries were as notable as their differences in size. Table 6.2 shows 
that New England and Lombardy produced heavier fabrics than Catalonia 
and Britain:" For the period as a whole, the quality ofthe New England cloth 
did not change considerably because about 75 per cent of production was 
always of the coarsest quality.6 Similarly, in Lombardy about two-thirds of the 
cotton cloth was of that quality. In a sharp contrast, Britain and Catalonia 
tended to concentrate their production in the medium range (counts from 
20 to 60). By the 1850s more than three-quarters of their production was in 
these counts, thus abandoning the production of the heaviest qualities. In 
Catalonia sharp decreases in the production of coarse cloth took place in the 
1840s, whereas in Britain this happened in the 1850s. Finally, it should also 
be noted that British industry reduced its share of the finest qualities (over 
60 count) although Britain was the country with the largest share of that type 
of cloth. 7 
Differences in export performance were also important. The weakness of 
the international position of Spanish, Italian and American cotton textiles 
during this early period should be emphasized. The export of cotton textiles 
from Spain or Italy was practically negligible and British exports were about 
thirty times as great as American exports, though America was the world's 
second-largest cotton textile producer (HarleY 1992: 576-9). On balance 
these three countries imported cotton textiles, mainly from Britain. By direct 
contrast, through the antebellum years, the British exported about two-
thirds of what they produced. Nevertheless, as Sandberg previously noted, 
from 1845 Britain gradually lost its share of the world market, being replaced 
by the new European and US cotton industries (Ellison 1968: 97ff; Sandberg 
1968). 
Table 6.3 shows the evolution of cotton textiles exports from Britain to 
these three countries and the Mediterranean basin. 
Overall cotton exports from Britain grew faster than cotton exports to the 
United States, Italy and Spain. From the 1820s to the 1850s, total figures for 
British cotton exports more than doubled whereas exports to the United 
States only increased by about 78 per cent, exports to Spain practically 
halved, and exports to Italy grew by a mere 32 per cent. The Spanish and Ital-
ian experience is also striking when compared with the rest of the Mediterra-
nean basin, where British exports experienced a sudden increase. More 
specifically, in the early 1820s over 80 per cent of British cotton textiles 
exported to the Mediterranean basin were concentrated in the countries of 
the Iberian and Italian peninsulas, whereas by the end of 1850s this figure 
was only about 50 per cent. 
Interestingly, Sandberg has proposed a quality-related explanation to the 
persistence of British exports in the countries with emerging cotton factory-
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Table 6.3 British cotton textile exports, 1820-1858 (in thousands of £, average per 
year) 
Mediterranean 
World Basin United States spain Italy 
1820-29 16948 3544 1825 808 1422 
1830-39 20914 4120 1874 537 1 710 
1840-49 24361 5207 1359 584 1537 
1850-58 34197 5154 3263 421 1881 
Notes and Sources: 
Numbers subject to rounding errors. 
Figures are in current values. The data are drawn from Mann (1968). 
Spanish figures include smuggling which has been computed according to the procedures 
described in notes to Figure 6.1. 
based industries. According to him, Britain continued to export high-quality 
goods to the American and western European markets while very cheap 
goods went to the rapidly expanding low-income markets (Sandberg 1968). 
Thus, the British cotton industry lost almost all of the markets for coarse and 
medium-quality cloth in Europe. Note that the evidence presented in Table 
6.2 gives some support to Sandberg's arguments since the American, Span-
ish and Italian cotton industries produced coarser quality than Britain's. The 
evident questions are why European producers and the United States spe-
cialized in relatively low-quality and not in high-quality cloth? And why these 
important differences in quality-mix among Catalonia, Piedmont and New 
England? 
Technology in cotton textiles 
In this section I will show that in the pre-cotton famine period several alter-
native technologies were available to entrepreneurs in cotton textiles.8 Some 
technologies required more power than others, some were suitable for 
domestic production and others simply not, some relied on a skilled 
workforce whereas others were suitable for unskilled labour. Equally impor-
tant is the relation between machinery and the quality of goods because only 
a narrow range of machinery could be used to make each quality. Conse-
quently, the range of "appropriate" technological options was more limited 
than the large list of machines might suggest. 
Both spinning and weaving machines of the mid-nineteenth century were 
improvements on pioneering machines that dated from the Industrial Revo-
lution. Power costs, and innovations in power sources, strategically affected 
these improvements (Von Tunzelmann 1978: 175-240). However, the 
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phases of development in fine and coarse spinning showed importan t differ-
ences, both in comparison with weaving and between themselves. 
The mid-nineteenth-century cotton-spinning machinery is clearly recog-
nizable as the descendant of the two spinning machines invented in the 
1760s. The jenny was invented by James Hargreaves and the water frame was 
developed by Richard Arkwright. Hargreaves' jenny spun intermittently 
whereas Arkwright's water frame was based on continuous methods of spin-
ning. While the jennies were made of wood and their small size made them 
appropriate for use in domestic units, the water frames were used in large 
factories. However, these two primitive spinning machines proved to be com-
plementary rather than competitive because of their wide differences. The 
water frame was at least five times as productive as the jenny but could not 
produce fine counts; therefore, it was used basically for the production of 
warps. On the other hand, yarn from the jenny was most suitable for wefts 
but this machine suffered a sharp decline in cost-efficiency when used for 
anything above quite coarse counts of yarn. In consequence, factory produc-
tion of warp yarn on water frames also increased cottage production of weft 
yarn on jennies. 
In the following decades, new intermittent spinning machines meant the 
demise of Hargreaves' jenny but not the ruin of continuous methods, which 
could produce coarse yarn faster and more cheaply than these new 
machines. Samuel Crompton invented the mule in 1779. This new spinning 
machine broke through the technical barrier to permit the economical spin-
ning of fine yarns by machine methods. The first mules were made of wood 
and their small size made them suitable for use in domestic production. 
However, by 1790 new large mules made of metal and powered by water-
wheels were being used in large factories which specialized in spinning fine 
yarns (Von Tunzelmann 1978: 224). By the 1830s, the mule was improved by 
Richard Roberts, who invented the self-acting mule. Until this new device 
appeared, a man's strength had been required for pushing the mule spindles 
back and forth on their carriage. When the self-actor removed this require-
ment, one spinner could now work up to 1,200 spindles, compared with 
about 300 on a traditional mule. Several constraints limited the universal use 
of the self-acting mule: it required more power, more repairs, more techni-
cians, and was less flexible (since it had greater difficulty in changing quickly 
from one grade of yarn to another) than the hand-mule. In effect, until the 
1850s, the self-acting mule could only spin yarn below the count number 50. 
Extremely fine yarn was spun on the older hand-mules into the 1880s. 
The continuous method of spinning was also improved in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. In 1828, John Thorp and Charles Danforth devel-
oped independently the throstle, a variant of the water frame, in the United 
States.9 This spinning machine automatically and continuously performed 
the drawing, twisting, and winding of yarn. The only intervention in the spin-
ning process required from workers in throstles was to mend yarns when 
they broke and to replace bobbins. It should be noted that these tasks could 
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be easily learned in a few days of training. In sharp contrast, the self-acting 
mule required specific skills and continuous attention from operatives. 1O By 
the 1850s, the Americans made other important improvements in continuous 
spinning. For example, the development of cap-spinning and ring-spinning 
allowed continuous spinning to achieve higher speeds than before. These 
primitive ring throstles required very great motive power and it was not possi-
ble to spin yarn of fine grades of sufficient quality on them. Because of these 
disabilities, the self-acting mule was not eclipsed by early ring throstles. For 
example, in the 1860s, only the American industry had almost as many ring 
throstles as mule spindles (Saxonhouse and Wright 1984: 274). 
At the beginning, the diffusion of the new machinery in cotton spinning-
which lowered the price of yarns - expanded handloom weaving. The first 
serious efforts to mechanize the operation of the handloom date back to the 
attempts of Edmund Cartwright in 1787. In 1803, Horrocks patented the 
first truly workable powerloom. But it was not until after 1815 that power-
driven machinery (i.e. powerlooms) began to play more than an insignifi-
cant role in cotton weaving. As with the mule, the primitive powerloom tech-
nology was modified over many years, and it was not until the 1850s that 
weaving by machine triumphed over traditional handl oom weaving in England. 
It took considerably longer in other countries and textile industries.ll 
Technological choices 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, technological leadership 
remained in the hands of the British cotton industry. As shown above, a great 
part of the progress in cotton technology during the period was due to Brit-
ish engineers. 12 Though some European regions, and later New England, 
made many technological advances, Lancashire supplied all or most of the 
textile machinery to most factories in Europe. The first European cotton 
mills were completely British in design and equipment. Many skilled British 
workers, including women, performed important technical functions in the 
new factories. For example, they provided technical advice and guidance as 
well as supervision and management, and trained local workers in the new 
technology. According to Bruland (1989), British machinery suppliers pro-
vided foreign textile firms with a complete array of information, equipment, 
and labour. In other words, they provided the technological capability to new 
cotton factories. However, once they got this technological capability, non-
British factories ran by themselves. 
In Britain, at the very beginning of the nineteenth century, the fine-spinning 
branch was the most technologically advanced because, for example, it was 
the first to apply steam-power to the new textile machinery. These substantial 
improvements cheapened finer yarns, which had noticeable effects on both 
exports and cloth fashion. In particular, British firms produced cotton more 
cheaply than Indian ones (Von Tunzelmann 1978: 224). By the 1830s, how-
ever, technological leadership in cotton spinning moved to the production 
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of coarse yarn (Von Tunzelmann 1978: 184ft). Robert's self-acting mule, 
along with cheaper steam-power and refinements in powerlooms in the fol-
lowing decade, greatly reduced prices of ordinary cloth. Therefore, by the 
mid-nineteenth century, the British cotton industry remained organized in 
two different branches: fine- and coarse-spinning mills (Gatrell 1977). Also, 
many coarse mills integrated vertical powerloom weaving (Gatrell 1977; 
Lyons 1985). 
The first modern spinning machinery (i.e. Arkwright's water frames) 
appeared in the United States during the last years of the eighteenth cen-
tury.13 The embargo and the war with Great Britain had favoured the settle-
ment of the cotton industry in the United States. But the first great 
expansion of the industry took place from the end of the Warofl812, when 
the industry was protected by high tariffs (Zevin 1971; Stettler 1977). In this 
early period, American cotton-textile mills, which were known as the Rhode 
Island type, were comparable to British coarse-spinning factories. 
In a few years, American practices diverged from Britain's. American 
cotton mills preferred water-driven to power-driven machinery and worked 
their machines more quickly than the British (Montgomery 1840; Von 
Tunzelmann 1978: 266ft). As noted above, American engineers not only ran 
the same British machinery at faster speeds but also improved continuous 
methods of spinning, which required more installed power. Perhaps more 
interestingly, by the 1820s the Americans had introduced their own new type 
of cotton mill: the Waltham-type. They integrated power-spinning on 
throstles and powerlooms and a new form of organization of the workforce. 
According toJeremy, these new mills succeeded in lowering the cost of pro-
duction for the coarsest products (J eremy 1981). However, until the Ameri-
can Civil War, both types of mills survived (Cohen 1990). Rhode Island-type 
mills and hand-weavers specialized in the segments of the market where fash-
ion and flexibility were more important while the Waltham-type dominated 
the market for standardized products (Harley 1992). 
The Catalan cotton industry was older than New England's. The first 
enterprises devoted to printing cotton cloth were established in Barcelona in 
the late 1720s.14 These calicoes were sold in the protected markets of the 
Metropoly and the Spanish colonies in America.15 Because for most of the 
eighteenth century all cotton yarn was imported (mainly from Malta), as well 
as a large part of the grey cloth consumed, cotton spinning and weaving were 
not important. It took about sixty years for Catalonia to develop cotton-spin-
ning. In 1802, the new spinning industry was heavily protected since the 
import of foreign yarn and cloth was forbidden. Through the thirty years 
that followed the ban, domestic production and out-working were common 
practice in cotton-spinning. Thus, cotton-spinning tended to remain dis-
persed in the villages and small towns of the lower Pyrenees, where they 
could rely upon a good supply of cheap female and child labour, rather than 
becoming concentrated in the calico centre of Barcelona.16 Initially, due to 
its unskilled workforce and the use of jennies and water frames, Catalan 
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spinning concentrated on the low grades of yarn (below 20 count). During 
the same period, hand-weavers proliferated in the major Catalan manufac-
turing towns (Sfmchez 1989). Catalan cotton cloth was also coarse due to the 
ban on cotton yarn imports. Nevertheless, skilled hand-weavers produced a 
wide range of qualities by using other textile fibres such as wool, linen and 
silk.17 This development of the domestic industry was accompanied by the 
scattered adoption of the steam engine. 
In 1832, the Bonaplata mill in troduced the new forms of organization, the 
steam engine, and the most recent British machinery (e.g. the powerloom 
Nadal 1974: 198). In a few years, the new machinery was universally 
employed in cotton-spinning and dominated cotton-weaving. The Catalan 
industry was characterized during this period by the rapid adoption of 
mechanical innovations. For example, Catalan cotton mills made the transi-
tion from hand to self-acting mules in only a decade, so that by the 1850s 
more than 75 per cent of spindles were moved by self-actors (Ronquillo 
1851-7; Maluquer de Motes 1976). The diffusion of the new machinery par-
alleled the increase in the quality oflocal production since the average count 
increased to 30 count from about 15 count (Figuerola 1968; Madoz 1846). 
Moreover, the vertically integrated cotton mills expanded rapidly and cap-
tured the market for coarse-medium cloth. However, well before the 1860s, 
some horizontal spinning mills and domestic hand-weaving survived by pro-
ducing for more fashion-oriented segments of the market (Roses 1998b: Ch. 
8). 
In the first phases of the adoption of the new machinery, during the 1830s 
and the early 1840s, British and French technicians and workers played a 
leading role but, by the 1840s, the foreign workers had been completely sub-
stituted in their tasks by local technicians. Therefore, after the initial period, 
the Catalans developed the capacity to maintain their own machinery, 
adopted the new technologies and, obviously, ran them without any foreign 
help. Through the post-adoption phase, Catalan firms incorporated a stream 
of incremental developments and modifications to improve and adapt for-
eign technology to local requirements (Roses 1998a). For instance, like the 
Americans, they developed their own type of centralized, vertically inte-
grated, water-driven cotton-spinning and weaving factory: the colonia 
(Carreras 1983; NadaI1991). 
The cotton industry in the Piedmont was less developed than in the other 
three regions that are considered in this study.18 During the eighteen th cen-
tury, several regulations and laws protecting the wool and silk industries pre-
vented the expansion of cotton textiles. Up to the second decade of the 
nineteenth century, cotton textile firms had not adopted some modern spin-
ning machinery (i.e. hand-mules). In this early period, the cotton industry 
was predominantly domestic and rural, employing an unskilled workforce. 
Moreover, capital for this early development came from foreign entrepre-
neurs, mainly Swiss and French. These foreign entrepreneurs also intro-
duced the technology and production methods of their countries of origin. 
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Therefore, most of the Piedmont cotton mills bought almost all their 
machinery from Alsatian and Swiss engineering firms. It should be noted, 
however, that the machines did not differ from original British designs 
(Fisher 1991: 145ff). By the 1830s, economic policy increasingly benefitted 
cotton textiles since the government established high tariffs on cotton 
imports. As happened in Catalonia before 1832, these protective measures 
increased production but failed to stimulate the adoption of power-driven 
h· 19 mac mery. 
Certainly, the turning point in the history of the Piedmont cotton industry 
was in 1842. The government of Piedmont drastically reduced tariffs on 
cotton goods. Contrary to the most pessimistic observations, these free-trade 
measures did not ruin the industry but contributed to its modernization 
since they eased the substitution of factories for small units of production 
(Castronovo 1965: 24-5). In addition, by the same year, modern waterwheels 
and throstles were introduced in Piedmont. Only a few years later, by the 
1850s, several spinning factories adopted self-acting mules. In a sharp con-
trast, cotton weaving did not show signs of modernization. This branch of 
cotton textiles did not experience any kind of mechanical breakout until the 
1870s, when the first powerlooms were used by the new vertically integrated 
cotton-spinning and weaving factories. Therefore, up to the 1870s, cotton-
spinning took place in factories whereas the domestic system and putting-out 
predominated in cotton-weaving (Castronovo 1965: 164). 
Labour management in the very early factory period was similar in 
Catalonia, Piedmont, Lancashire and New England because all cotton facto-
ries combined two forms of factory management: subcontracting and 
foremanship.20 More specifically, workers in the preparatory section and 
spinners on throstles were supervised by foremen, whereas spinners on 
mules were organized into autonomous, subcontracted work teams. In par-
ticular, these spinners had functional autonomy because the craft-oriented 
machinery ran intermittently. Thus, they decided the pace of their work, 
organized their own work teams, had the authority to hire and fire assistants, 
and were paid by piece. 
However, by the 1850s, US practices moved towards a new system of pro-
duction with a workforce mainly formed of women and children controlled 
by foremen (Cohen 1990). The adoption of powerlooms and self-acting 
mules in the United States went hand in hand with the transition from sub-
contracting to foremanship (Cohen 1990: especially Ch. 6). In Piedmont, 
where the division of labour had been less important (Castronovo 1965: 
222ff) , the adoption of throstles and self-acting mules signified the elimina-
tion of piece-rate payments among spinners. According to Castronovo, oper-
atives in Lombardy's cotton factories were subject to rigid norms and only 
foreign technicians and foremen had any autonomy (Castronovo 1965: 
224-6). By sharp contrast with the United States and Piedmont, the main 
consequence of the diffusion of the self-acting mule in Catalonia and Britain 
was the reduction of the number of helpers, but not the dislocation of craft 
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control from the shop floor. Similarly, it seems that Catalan and Lancashire 
weavers managed to retain their autonomous position in production even if 
the introduction of the powerloom could have increased foremanship prac-
tices in some weaving factories. 21 
The difference in the technological development of the four cotton indus-
tries is indeed quite startling. We have seen that there are marked differences 
in the adoption of the factory system, labour management, the new machin-
ery, and even in the type of machinery preferred. At first glance, the Ameri-
can, Spanish and Italian cotton industries employed during several decades 
machinery and techniques inferior to Britain's. However, by the l850s, this 
technology gap had been practically cut by these followers. Then, the typical 
American, Spanish, or Italian cotton mill possessed the same machinery as 
the most modern British cotton mill. Energy costs were partly responsible for 
this delay in the adoption of new machinery, which was more power-inten-
sive. Thus the invention of the high-pressure steam engine, which decreased 
coal costs, might ease the adoption of self-acting mules and powerlooms in 
Spain.22 However, at this point, many readers can agree that it seems difficult 
to explain the choice of technology only in terms of technological gaps and 
energy costs. 
Explaining technological choices 
The discussion thus far suggests that the choice of technology and quality 
were closely connected in cotton textiles before the "cotton famine". For 
instance, American producers preferred throstles to hand-mules because 
they produced coarse fabrics. Meanwhile, fine-spinning mills in Britain 
never employed throstles and preferred hand-mules. Therefore, it can be 
argued that one can interpret technological choices by explaining the final 
determinants of quality-mix. It should be noted that several alternative 
explanations for quality choices have been advanced in the literature on 
cotton textiles. 
Sandberg poin ted out that it is possible that quality-mix was a consequence 
of the life-cycle of the cotton industry. Young cotton industries produce low-
quality goods because they did not require skilled or experienced labour and 
there was a large domestic market for them (Sandberg 1968: 15). Instead, 
mature cotton industries were able to specialize in high-quality cloth as a 
consequence of their skilled labour. However, the same history of the New 
England cotton industry gives little support to this argument because the 
industry matured but was still producing coarse goods. 
It is often maintained that the characteristics and sizes of markets shaped 
the product choice of the cotton industry. For example, Sandberg has 
argued that only a worldwide exporter such as Britain was likely to have a 
large market for high-quality goods (Sandberg 1968: 15). Therefore, accord-
ing to this line of reasoning, all small countries should only develop the pro-
duction of heavy cloth. The obvious counter-example is the small Swiss 
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cotton industry that produced high-quality cotton goods and could success-
fully compete with Britain in some European markets for expensive cloth 
(Dudzik 1987). On the other hand, many authors have argued that the 
cotton mills in the USA were biased towards standard and cheap products 
because of the size and income of their home demand.23 Following the same 
logic, one would expect Catalan cotton mills to produce cheap cotton goods 
since the Spanish home market for textiles was poorer and smaller than 
other European and American markets.24 However, the Catalan cotton 
industry produced more medium-range than cheap goods. Therefore, it 
seems that the size of the home market does not by itself furnish a convinc-
ing explanation for the quality-mix of the cotton industries. It would be more 
appropriate, however, to relate the characteristics of home production to the 
preferences of the home consumers. According to this line of reasoning, 
consumers in the USA would be more prepared to buy standard products 
than European consumers. However, this argument cannot be verified 
quantitatively. 
It is sometimes argued that barriers to free trade modify the quality of the 
local production and foreign imports.25 During the nineteenth century, two 
types of tariffs were employed: ad valorem and fixed duties. The ad valorem 
duties have several relevant properties. First, ad valorem duties were higher 
on cheap than on expensive goods and, therefore, the level of protection was 
higher for the local production of heavy (low-quality) goods (Sandberg 
1968: 15). Second, it is perfecdy clear that, ceteris paribus, countries with 
higher ad valorem duties would exclude from their home markets finer goods 
than countries with lower barriers. Third, increases in ad valorem duties aug-
mented the range of protected goods towards fine (expensive) qualities. 
Finally, the quality range of foreign production excluded from the home 
market rests on the price oflocal production and the amount of the duty. For 
the same reason, when local costs fell and the duty actually remained con-
stant, both the level of protection and the range of goods protected rose. In 
fixed duties, instead, when local costs decreased and the duty was not modi-
fied, the level of protection grew but not necessarily the range of goods 
protected by the tariff. 
Several studies have discussed the influence of tariffs on the development 
of the cotton industry in the USA. 26 Through the antebellum period, the US 
tariffs were in ad valorem terms. Duties on cotton textiles imports were estab-
lished in 1789 and changed no less than twenty times up to the Civil War. The 
first tariff on cotton goods was relatively lower (5 per cent ad valorem) and 
comparable to tariffs on other manufactured products. In the period 
1790-1811, the ad valorem duty grew in successive reforms up to 15 per cent. 
The first great reform happened in 1812 when duties were practically dou-
bled (27.5 per cent) to finance the war. Moreover, in 1816, a law was passed 
by Congress that established the minimum valuation for all pieces of cloth 
imported into the United States. Note that the system of minimum values 
reinforced the fact that duties rested more on coarse than fine cloth. In 1832 
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the system of minimum values was dropped and rates were generally lowered 
although the ad valorem rate was still higher (25 percent). From 1842 to 1846 
there was another protective bubble and ad valorem rates were increased to 
30 per cent. Finally in 1846 Congress lowered the tariff to 25 per cent and 
eliminated the minimum valuation.27 The US tariff had disproportionate 
effects on the various cotton goods because it gave more protection to heavy 
than to light cotton cloth. However, Harley has recently shown that the level 
of protection of the industry in the USA, even after the reform of 1846, was 
enough to protect the production of coarse and medium-range cotton cloth 
(Harley 1992: Table 2, 562). Therefore, the level of protection was so high 
that it probably had negligible effects on the New England cotton mills' 
choice between coarse and medium products. 
The Spanish cotton industry was protected from 1802 by the ban on 
cotton yarn and cloth imports (NadaI1974). In theory, obviously, the level of 
protection in Spain was higher than in the United States. By the 1840s the 
scope of the ban was limited to yarn below 60 count and cloth produced with 
that type of yarn. 28 This modification of the structure of the tariff might not 
have directly affected Spanish production since the domestic industry pro-
duced very little yarn above 60 count. Therefore, the level of protection was 
so high that it probably had negligible effects on the Spanish cotton mills' 
choice between coarse and medium products. However, one must be aware 
that the ban on foreign imports was difficult to enforce during these years. As 
a consequence, smuggled British fabrics reached a large portion of the 
Spanish market (Prados 1984). 
The obvious question is whether changes in the enforcement of the ban 
can explain changes in the choice of quality of the Catalan mills. Specifically, 
if the movement towards the medium-range fabrics in the 1840s was caused 
by an increase in the "real" level of protection (i.e. in the risk of smuggling 
due to an increase in the repression of the illegal trade). Note that the quan-
tity of foreign goods illegally imported was a function of the margin received 
by smugglers, the premium risk obtained by consumers, and the risk 
involved in this illegal activity. For example, when the risk increases and the 
margin remains constant, smuggling decreases (i.e., the "real" level of pro-
tection and, therefore, the market for home industry increases). Moreover, 
if the risk of smuggling was little or unvaried over time, one could expect 
that, over the long run, the quantity of smuggled goods paralleled the 
margin received by smugglers and was independent of the risk incurred in 
illegal trade. Here, the hypothetical margin of smugglers is easy to compute 
since the premium risk received by consumers in Spain was negligible. The 
reason for this was that Spanish law punished only the smuggler and not the 
buyer, and the seizure of smuggled goods could only take place within the 
frontier zone. Thus, the margin of smugglers was equal to the domestic price 
of cotton goods minus transport costs and the foreign price of those goods. 
Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between the amount of smuggling and the 
margin of smugglers. 
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Figure 6.1 Smuggling of British goods in Spain (in £) and margin of smugglers (five-
year averages), 
Notes and sources: 
The value of smuggling has been computed according to the formula proposed by Prados 
(1984). That is, British smuggling of cotton goods in Spain = 0.2 x exports to Portugal + 0.8 x ex-
ports to Gibraltar. The data on the value of exports to Gibraltar and Portugal is furnished by 
Mann (1968), table 25. The margin of smugglers is defined as the difference between the Span-
ish and British prices of printed cloth minus transport costs divided by British prices. For Span-
ish and British prices see Roses (1998b), chapter 9. 
If Figure 6.1 shows the true trend in smuggling and the smugglers' 
margin, one can reasonably infer that the quantity of smuggled cotton goods 
relies on the changes in the price gap between home and foreign goods. 
That is, the ban worked like an ad valorem tariff fixed at a (high) rate. In par-
ticular, the rapid decrease in the early 1840s of the quantity smuggled was 
due to the decrease in the price gap (margin), not to an increase in the 
repression of the illegal commerce. However, Figure 6.1 must be read and 
interpreted with caution since the data is highly imperfect. First, short-run 
variations cannot be captured by the formula that was used to compute the 
smuggling of British cotton goods because the formula was based on fixed 
coefficients. Second, the margin has been estimated as the difference 
between the prices of printed cloth in Spain and Britain. But it is possible 
that the difference between other types of Spanish and British cotton cloth 
did not evolve in unison with printed cloth. Third, Figure 6.1 cannot explain 
why smuggling increased faster during the 1830s. In any case, it seems 
implausible to link the movement of the Catalan cotton industry towards 
medium-range goods with a hypothetical increase in the repression of illegal 
trade. The level of protection grew due to the increase in the efficiency of the 
local production and, therefore, the local improvements were the main 
reason for the shift of production towards medium-range cotton fabrics. 
In Piedmont, duties on cotton textile imports were first established in 
1815 and were reformed several times up to 1860.29 These tariffs were based 
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on fIxed duties for each kind of yarn or cloth. Early Piedmont tariff policy 
gave more protection to coarse than fIner cotton goods and to weaving than 
spinning. The fIrst important reform happened in 1830 when duties on 
coarse yarns (below 26 count) increased to 2 lire/kg, on medium yarns 
(from 26 to 49 count) to 1.50 lire/kg, and on fIne yarns (up to 50 count) to 1 
lire/kg. Similarly, duties on cotton cloth also grew and were fIxed from a 
minimum of about 4 lire/kg on grey cloth to a maximum of 5-5.5 lire/kg on 
printed cloth. In 1842 the system offIxed duties was dropped and rates were 
generally lowered although the effective protection was still higher.30 For 
instance, the common price of local yarns of the 8 count was about 2.5 
lire/kg whereas the price of the imported British yarn, including duties, 
reached about 2.8 lire/kg (that is: 1.94 lire plus 0.9 lire ofduty).31 Finally in 
1851 Cavour lowered the tariffs and signed a free-trade agreement with Bel-
gium, a major producer of cotton textiles. Moreover, the structure of duties 
was modifIed, imposing higher duties on the fIne qualities. Mter these 
reforms, duties on yarn were fIxed from a minimum of 0.2 lire/kg in coarse 
yarn to a maximum of 0.6 lire/kg in fIne yarn while duties on cloth were 
frxed from a minimum of 0.75 lire/kg on grey cloth to a maximum of 1.5 
lire/kg on printed cloth. In spite of these reforms, the level of protection of 
the industry in Piedmont was enough to preserve the home production of 
coarse and medium-range cotton yarn.32 Likewise, duties on cloth were so 
high that foreign cloth encountered many problems in Piedmont markets.33 
Consequently, the level of protection was so intense that it presumably had 
insignifIcant effects on the Piedmontese cotton fIrms' option between 
coarse and medium products. 
It should also be considered that tariffs were endogenously, not exoge-
nously, determined. In other words, the government did not establish duties 
independently of the pressure of local groups. Spain and Italy furnished 
many examples of duties influenced by local industrialists. In Spain, when 
the ban on foreign cotton imports was reformed in the 1840s, the employers' 
organization (the Junta de Fabricas de Cataluiia) showed little opposition to 
reducing the ban to yarn up 60 count. The reason was that local spinners 
produced little yarn above 60 count and mixed-fabrics weavers needed this 
type of yarn (Comisi6n Especial Aranceleria 1867). Similarly, in Piedmont, 
Ligurian weavers specializing in fIne cloth promoted lower tariffs on fine 
yarn because of the scarce local production of that good (Castronovo 1965: 
302). Moreover, protection on cloth was higher than on yarn because the 
numerous hand-weavers could exert strong pressure on successive govern-
ments (Castronovo 1965: 305ff). Thus, one can argue that some cotton 
goods received more protection than others, simply because they were pro-
duced by the local industry. In consequence, duties were not established to 
modifY the quality of home production. 
The three interpretations traditionally advanced in the literature have to 
be rejected. Neither the life-cycle of the industry, nor home-market 
JoanRamonRoses 151 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
~ 3 
& ~ 2.5 i-----------
~ 2 Labour 
a: 1.51======--__ --;:--_____ _ 
Energy 
0.5 Cotton 
O+---------~--------~--------_r--------~--------~ 15& 18 20&30 30&40 40&50 50&60 70&90 
Count 
Figure 6.2 Producing costs of cotton cloth: Barcelona, 1860. 
Notes and sources: Count refers to the count of yarn used in producing the cloth. The source is 
Comisi6n Especial Arancelaria (1867). The figures are drawn from the answer of the Espaiia In-
dustrial S.A. The cost of the weaving in the quality 20&30 and 50&60 has been estimated. The 
cost of yarn in 15&18 counts is drawn from the answer of Jose Ferrer & Cia. This last figure has 
been modified to eliminate the transport costs of raw cotton and other materials from Barce-
lona to Vilanova, where the second firm was settled. Note that cotton comprises the wastage. En-
ergy comprises not only coal for light and power but also other minor raw materials. Labour 
includes all labour cost even those outside the shop floor. Finally, capital costs comprise depreci-
ation, profits and capital taxes. 
Table 6.4 Share of inputs in total costs of cotton cloth: Barcelona, 1860 (per cent) 
Coarse Medium Fine 
Yarn count 15 & 18 20&30 30&40 40&50 50&60 70&90 
Cotton 53.41 47.00 38.51 27.70 18.98 18.31 
Energy 8.94 10.10 11.76 13.77 15.21 15.58 
Labour 24.39 27.84 31.26 37.37 42.92 42.16 
Capital 13.25 15.06 18.47 21.16 22.90 23.95 
Notes and Sources: See Figure 6.2. 
characteristics, nor barriers to free trade provide a sufficient explanation of 
the quality-mix of the three cotton industries summarized in Table 6.2. 
Anyone who attempts to analyse the choice among different cloth quali-
ties is immediately confronted with the fact that the combination of inputs 
changes through the quality range. As mentioned above, a different combi-
nation of energy, raw cotton, labour, and human and physical capital was 
employed to produce each quality of cloth. Therefore, it should be relatively 
straightforward to relate product-mix to factor endowments. 
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Figure 6.2 and Table 6.4 illustrate the costs of producing the different 
qualities of cotton cloth from the point of view of the Catalan manufacturers. 
Figure 6.2 practically covers the entire universe of Catalan production of 
cotton cloth and can be considered to be representative of the state of the 
industry at the end of the 1850s. A major objection, however, might be raised 
against this cost figure. It is impossible to assess the importance of labour-
force skills and machinery alternatives in the production of the different 
qualities, since the two factories considered could produce the whole range 
of yarn and cloth. 
Figure 6.2 shows that the production cost of cloth grew at different rates at 
each point; that is, the cost-quality relation was not a straight line.34 Interest-
ingly, the increase in total costs is more important in the transition from the 
medium to the finest qualities than in the transition from the coarsest to the 
medium qualities. For example, the cost of producing one square metre of 
coarse fabric (15 & 18 count) was about Rv 2.40. Whereas the cost ofproduc-
ing one square metre of medium-range fabric (30 & 40 count) was about Rv 
2.56 (i.e. only about 6.6 per cent more). More specifically, raw cotton costs 
per square metre decreased throughout the spectrum of coarse-medium 
qualities, although wastage increases with count. In the fine qualities, partic-
ularly above 60 count, the raw cotton costs grew again due to the use of a 
large-staple and, therefore, expensive fibre. On the other hand, labour, 
capital and energy costs rose with count increases. 
Table 6.4 displays the fact that the share of different inputs in total costs 
varied according to quality. Thus, the coarsest quality was the most raw-mate-
rials intensive and least labour-intensive, whereas the opposite holds for the 
finest qualities. Note that the two factories in the sample could produce the 
whole range of goods given their stocks of human and physical capital. 35 For 
that reason, the ratios of capital to labour and energy to labour are rather 
constant. However, they actually produced more medium-quality than other 
types of cloth (e.g. the share of medium-quality cloth in the production of 
Espaiia Industrial SA was about 80 per cent of the total). In other words, it 
seems that they were better prepared, given their stock of physical and 
human capital, to produce medium-range goods. 
Figures for the whole Catalan cotton industry would probably diverge by 
some amount from the sample figures. Thus, firms specializing in the coars-
est qualities used throstles instead of self-acting mules and, therefore oper-
ated with relatively more capital and energy per worker than the sample 
firms. Conversely, cotton mills specializing in the finest qualities used mule-
jennies instead of self-acting mules and employed less capital and energy per 
worker.36 In a few words, the figures presented above presumably overstate 
the share oflabour in the cost of coarse qualities whereas the contrary holds 
for finest qualities. 
Manufacturers in Catalonia were constrained by the price they had to pay 
for raw cotton and for coal, which was primarily influenced by geological and 
geographical factors. 37 The problem was alleviated by producing more fine 
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cloth, which was less raw-materials intensive than coarse cloth. Thus, the effi-
cient firm on the frontier of the local best-practice tried to produce cloth as 
fine as was possible with the level of skills of its workforce. The more skilled 
the workforce, the finer the production, and the high cost of raw materials 
was less important. In other words, cotton mills with less-skilled labour spe-
cialized in products in which the inferiority of their workforce had relatively 
little impact on the final price (Le. in coarse cloth), whereas cotton mills with 
a highly skilled labour force did exactly the opposite. The constraint on this 
movement towards fine cloth in Catalonia was the efficiency of the local 
labour force, because the finest qualities were generally beyond the abilities 
of the Catalan workers.38 However, it is not clear whether one should speak 
about the human capital constraint or the climatic constraint. The fact is that 
the thread breakages varied with the count level (high counts broke more 
often than coarse counts) and the dampness of the climate. Because 
Catalonia is less damp than Lancashire it is clear that thread tended to break 
more often in the former than the latter. For instance, during the summer, 
many spinning firms were at a standstill in Catalonia due to the low levels of 
d 39 ampness. 
Differences in the workforce skills facing the four countries at the time 
give strong support to the arguments advanced in the previous paragraph. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, British and Catalonian work-
ers were employed in different positions according to their skills. In hand 
and self-acting mules workers were skilled, whereas in throstles and prepara-
tory machines workers were unskilled. Thus, in the production of coarse 
yarn workers were unskilled whereas the contrary holds for the finest quali-
ties. Instead, the US and Piedmontese mills used self-acting mules and 
throstles, and an unskilled labour force to produce coarse cotton cloth. In 
particular, a contemporary described the situation of the cotton factories in 
Italy with the following words: "when a factory is unable to specialize in its 
working, then fewer, low-quality goods are produced, since it is forced to use 
what could be called generic machinery ... and has generic workers as well".40 
Conclusions 
Despite the fact that the data reported on the previous pages have their limi-
tations, one can argue that they provide an explanation for the technical 
choice and quality-mix of the Catalan cotton firms and, by extension, of the 
Piedmontese, British and US cotton mills. On average, Catalan cotton mills 
produced cloth that was in the middle of the extreme choices; the unskilled 
and raw-materials intensive production of the coarse-cloth New England 
mills, and the skills-intensive and raw-materials-saving choice of the fine-spin-
ning Lancashire cotton mills. Therefore, one can argue that it is likely that 
Catalonia had a scarce supply of raw materials, but that its labour force was 
on average more skilled than those in the USA but less skilled than the Brit-
ish. Piedmontese cotton mills, with similar raw-materials restrictions to 
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Catalonia, produced slightly finer cloth than US cotton mills. However, these 
cotton mills could not produce so fine a cloth as Catalan or British cotton 
mills, due to their unskilled workforce. Thus, there is strong evidence that 
the efficiency of labour, which is mainly the result of prior human-capital 
accumulation, is important in determining the drift of best-practice 
technology in cotton textiles. 
The other components of the quality choice must, however, be allowed 
their due. Plant and equipment costs were higher in Spain, Italy and the USA 
compared to Britain. This by itself lowered their optimal quality because it 
raised their relative operating speeds. Labour costs were higher in the USA 
and lower in Spain and Italy. In isolation this would have had the effects actu-
ally observed: lower quality in the former than in the latter. These aspects 
along with the particular characteristics of the consumers' choices are not 
perfectly disentangled. 
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